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In this paper I examine the concept of cross-temporal personal identity (diachronicity).
This particular form of identity has vexed theorists for centuries—e.g., how can a person
maintain a belief in the sameness of self over time in the face of continual psychological
and physical change? I first discuss various forms of the sameness relation and the criteria
that justify their application. I then examine philosophical and psychological treatments of
personal diachronicity (for example, Locke’s psychological connectedness theory; the role
of episodic memory) and find each lacking on logical grounds, empirical grounds or both.
I conclude that to achieve a successful resolution of the issue of the self as a temporal
continuant we need to draw a sharp distinction between the feeling of the sameness of
one’s self and the evidence marshaled in support of that feeling.
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Many of the constructs we grapple with in the behavioral sci-
ences have a common-sense familiarity that makes them seem
both conceptually clear and referentially transparent. However,
as often is true of common-sense notions, on careful reflection
they are found to be conceptually underspecified and referentially
vague (e.g., Russell, 1912/1999).
The deceptively simple notion of “identity” is a case in point.
When examined through an analytic lens, it becomes clear that
the totality of the topics for which identity is a focal concern—
e.g., personal identity, social identity, cultural identity, gender
identity, national identity, object identity, numerical identity,
occasional identity, contingent identity, indefinite identity, strict
identity, loose identity, qualitative identity, multiple identity—
is more akin to a complex fractal set (e.g., Mandelbrot, 1983)
than a well-formed taxonomy. Prior to engaging questions about
identity, therefore, I need to make clear how I will be using the
term.
FINDING THE TARGET: WHAT TYPE OF “IDENTITY” ARE WE
SEEKING?
In some contexts—primarily philosophical and mathematical—
identity takes a quantitatively strict and numerically exhaustive
form; it is, and only is, the realization of total property equiva-
lence between X and Y. This is the “numerical identity” of abstract
formalism, whose origins in Western thought trace to the writ-
ings of Parmenides in the 5th Century BCE (for an illuminating
discussion, see Papa-Grimaldi, 2010).
But “identity” can, and often does, mean very different things
in the sciences. Physical and social scientists frequently are con-
cerned with more flexible requirements for a numerically impre-
cise, qualitative form of identity (e.g., specification of a subset of
properties necessary and sufficient for an object to be taken as
the “same” over time; this sometimes is referred to as “exact sim-
ilarity,” e.g., Garrett, 1998). When questions of identity are asked
of things that can take different characteristics at different times,
numerical equivalence often gives way to conceptions of identity
that admit to degrees and remain applicable in the presence of
componential variation.
Many philosophers embrace the challenges that arise when
the conditions of identity are relaxed.Numerous “puzzle cases”
—amoebic cell division, the gradual replacement of an object’s
parts, brain transplants, split-brain surgery, body teletransporta-
tion, and many more—have received treatment (for reviews
see Wiggins, 1980; Parfit, 1984; Brennan, 1988; Noonan, 1989;
Oderberg, 1993; Gallios, 1998). But not all are equally accepting.
Hume, for example, felt that by allowing more flexible crite-
ria we inadvertently substitute “similarity” for “identity” (Hume,
1739–1740/1978). Butler (1736/1819) argued that we are wrong
to think that an object could gain or lose a part without bring-
ing an end to that object: Any change in an object’s constituents
would, of logical necessity, bring something new into existence.
On these views, we confuse identity with similarity—or, as Butler
sees it, the formal notion of strict identity has been substituted by
more colloquial notions of approximate or loose identity.
Substitution is not necessarily a problem, however, provided
we are clear about what we are doing and our reasons for doing so.
In the following section I briefly note some reasons that a change
from the strict requirements of numerical identity to a more mal-
leable conception is warranted when questions of identity are
tackled by scientists. To avoid confusion, I will adopt the term
“sameness” when discussing this type of less-than-perfect iden-
tity: sameness allows for less rigid, more qualitative criteria than
does the quantitatively exacting demands of numerical identity
(which is a type of sameness; see below).
DEGREES OF SAMENESS
In the sciences, objects of interest (whether concrete or abstract)
often are held to admit to “identity” despite alterations in their
properties and predicates. When entertaining the possibility of
identity in the face of change, words such as “exact similarity”
and “sameness” seem better suited to convey the type of identity
under consideration (e.g., Williams, 1973; Noonan, 1989; Gallios,
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1998; Garrett, 1998). Accordingly, rather than “identity”—which
implies a binary opposition conditionalized on the presence or
absence of complete property equivalence—I will use the term
“sameness.” This more flexible notion allows for a spectrum of
possibilities—ranging from sameness in its strict, numerical form
to sameness despite (sometimes considerable) componential vari-
ation. It thus is better positioned to capture the diversity of
quantitative as well as qualitative interests that characterize the
numerically imprecise identities often of interest in the sciences.
In its most analytically rigid form, “sameness” entails a quan-
titative equivalence between X and Y. This, I suggest, typically
is what we have in mind when we consider the term “identity”
absent qualifying contextualization (e.g., personal identity, ethnic
identity, gender identity, and so forth). Numerical sameness is a
property everything has to itself and to nothing else. Formally, it
is expressed as “X is the same as Y if and only if every property
or characteristic true of X is true of Y as well.” Historically, this
commonly is referred to as the “identity of indiscernibles,” and
in modern form traces to the work of Leibnitz (e.g., Williams,
2002). Despite its inherent circularity—i.e., numerical sameness
necessarily is true if and only if what is “true of X” is taken to
include “being identical with X”—it remains the foundational
expression of the concept of quantitative sameness (e.g., Brennan,
1988; Williams, 1990; Oderberg, 1993; Gallios, 1998). Interest in
this strict version of sameness is found primarily in philosophical
treatment and mathematical analysis, and will not be discussed
herein.
Satisfaction of the criteria for numerical sameness seldom is
in play when questions are directed toward issues of concern in
the sciences1. Numerical sameness is an equivalence relation that
must be true by virtue of the tautology it entails. Entities satis-
fying the requirements for numerical sameness would result in
a very narrowly circumscribed set (albeit a numerically large one,
since everything is quantitatively identical to itself at a given point
in time). The interests of social and physical scientists more often
are trained on sameness relations of entities that undergo changes
wrought by the passage of time. A stone, for example, can endure
erosion or supplementation (e.g., by mineral seepage), yet still
be judged the same stone; a person can be considered the same
person despite alterations in physical characteristics and men-
tal states. In these domains of inquiry, equivalence, construed as
numerically exhaustive, has little theoretical or empirical traction.
Accordingly, less restrictive notions are needed to accommo-
date the type of things toward which questions of sameness can be
posed despite property variance (e.g., Brennan, 1988; Oderberg,
1993). Questions of the sameness of objects (e.g., “is that the same
car I saw yesterday?”), propositions (e.g., “on closer analysis, the
two theories seem to be the same”), mental states (e.g., “I think we
have the same idea”) and more complex cases (e.g., the self: “Am I
the same person I was 10 years earlier?”) allow for the possibility
1This is not to suggest that questions pertaining to less demanding notions of
identity are ignored by philosophers. This is far from the case (e.g., Wiggins,
1971; Brennan, 1988; Noonan, 1989; Gallios, 1998). For example, questions
such as absolute vs. relative identity, the Ship of Theseus paradox and the
identity of a clay sculpture and the unformed lump out of which it was fash-
ioned are some of the less exacting, boundary issues of identity debated by
philosophers.
that X and Y are, in some sense, the same despite not satisfying
the strict requirements for numerical equivalence. An important
consequence of this relaxation in criteria is that it draws greater
attention to the thing being evaluated, broadening the scope of
analysis to include consideration not only of the sameness rela-
tion, but also of the nature of the relata placed in relation. This
change in accent, as we will see, takes a particular significance
when the object of inquiry is one’s self (e.g., Shoemaker, 1963;
Wiggins, 1971; Rorty, 1976; Hirsch, 1982; Baillie, 1993; Garrett,
1998; Baker, 2000; Lund, 2004; Perry, 2008; Sani, 2008)2.
SAMENESS AND THE SELF: THE PROBLEM OF PERSONAL
DIACHRONICITY
As Hume’s and Butler’s insights suggest, when addressing ques-
tions of identity in the sciences we often loosen the requirements
for numerical sameness. Our concern is how people judge or
perceive the qualitative sameness of an entity despite changes
with time. When the person is taken as the object of a sameness
judgment, the requirements of quantitative equivalence would,
of definitional necessity, preclude affirmation for any observation
falling outside the narrow boarders of instantaneity: the continual
change associated with the psycho-physical existence would make
personal diachronicity (i.e., the sameness of the person over time)
a logical impossibility (unless one subscribed to a view in which
change is an illusion, and the reality behind the illusion is in a state
of stasis; for discussion see Barbour, 2000 and Papa-Grimaldi,
2010).
Quantitative sameness clearly is not what we have in mind
when the sameness of persons is in question; rather, we are
interested in criteria that can be used to justify a belief that
Person X is the same at time T1 and at time T2. Under these
circumstances, conditions satisfying the tautological certainty of
numerical sameness give way to the search for criteria capable of
allowing for the possibility personal sameness despite alteration
in properties or predicates. As we will see in the section titled
Types of Self and Types of Personal Diachronicity: Evidence and
Certainty, criterial emendations are particularly complex when
the object of a sameness judgment also is the one making the
judgment—i.e., the sameness of one’s self.
Accordingly, questions of strict, numerical identity are not
(and cannot be) the concern theorists interested in personal
diachronicity (adoption of such criteria would result in an empty
set). Rather, our interest is in the criteria we rely on to attribute
spatio-temporal continuity to persons in general and the self in
particular. And, of logical and empirical necessity, these criteria
must entail the flexibility necessary to ascertain sameness despite
inevitable transformations in a person’s physical and mental
constituents.
In short, despite the use of the word “same” to categorize our
theoretical and empirical interests in the sameness of self (e.g.,
personal identity), we are concerned not with sameness in its
2In this paper, I sometimes will use the term “person” in place of the term
“self”. This philosophically debatable move is one not everyone will be com-
fortable with (e.g., Locke, 1689–1700/1975; Wilkes, 1988). My (occasional)
substitution of terms entails nothing beyond expositional convenience. While
I recognize the conceptual issues it raises, there should be little question of the
meaning I intend.
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strict, Liebnizian sense, but rather with a more qualitative ques-
tion of personal sameness or diachronicity. Indeed, when taken
as numerical equivalence, the question of personal sameness has
no meaning (save for the possibility of a Parmenidean vision of
reality as static perfection; e.g., Papa-Grimaldi, 2010).
Personal diachronicity (which henceforth will be restricted
in application to the “self”) is unique among topics amenable
to considerations of sameness. In addition to judgments made
by the self-as-subject of the self-as-object (see the next section),
sameness pertains also to judgments by the self-as-subject of
the self-as-subject. These self-reflexive 3 acts are limited to sen-
tient beings and likely apply with reasonable assurance only to
homo sapiens (e.g., Snodgrass and Thompson, 1997; Terrace and
Metcalfe, 2005). However, before pursuing the conditions that
must be satisfied to justify a judgment of personal diachronicity,
we need to make explicit what it is we take to be the target of the
sameness judgment—the self.
THE PROBLEM OF THE SELF
As those who study the self-have discovered, answers to the
question “What is the self?” are elusive at best (for reviews
see Johnstone, 1970; Gergen, 1971; Lewis, 1982; Vierkant, 2003;
Klein, 2012). Indeed, some are of the opinion that the question is
based on the illusion that there is an elusive self to be found (e.g.,
Albahari, 2006; Metzinger, 2009; for discussion see Siderits et al.,
2011). Of course, a problem with this perspective is that an illu-
sion is an experience and an experience requires an experiencer
(e.g., Strawson, 2011a; Klein, 2014a). AsMeixner (2008) observes,
“The fictionalization of subjects of experience is incoherent, since
it involves the incoherent idea that I, for example, am an illusion
of myself” (p. 162). Kant (1998) goes further, arguing that the self
of subjective awareness (his transcendental ego) must accompany
experience” [related views can be found in James (1890), Lund
(2005)].
Despite ontological concerns, psychology has found work
for the “self” in an abundance of subject-hyphen-predicate
relations (e.g., self-comparison, self-concept, self-esteem, self-
handicapping, self-image, self-perception, self-regulation, self-
reference, etc.). However, the focus of investigation rests firmly on
the predicate, to the detriment of an appreciation of what exactly
is the object of this diverse set of predicates—i.e., the self being
verified, conceptualized, esteemed, deceived, verified, regulated,
and handicapped (for review see Klein, 2012, 2014a).
This is not to say that psychology has failed to propose mod-
els of the self: formalizations have been on display for more
than 100 years [e.g., James, 1890; Greenwald, 1981; Neisser, 1988;
Kihlstrom and Klein, 1994; Conway, 2005; for recent reviews see
Leary and Tangney (2012) and Sedikides and Spencer (2007)].
Yet, most of these offerings target the self in a particular context,
rather than the self per se. We thus find models of cultural selves,
social selves, cognitive selves, synaptic selves, autobiographical
selves, social selves, narrative selves, etc. (cf., Leary and Tangney,
3Questions pertaining to how a subject takes itself qua subject, to be one
and the same, open the door to complex issues of self-reflexivity and the
philosophical puzzles they engender (e.g., Falk, 1995; Bolander et al., 2006;
Strawson, 2009). Their treatment is beyond the scope of this paper.
2003, 2012). But consideration of what the self is that serves as the
bedrock of these cultural, social, cognitive, synaptic, and narrative
instantiations, typically is under-specified (e.g., Klein and Gangi,
2010; Klein, 2014a).
THE TWO SELVES: THE NEURAL SELF OF SCIENCE AND THE
SUBJECTIVE SELF OF FIRST-PERSON PHENOMENOLOGY
One reason for the difficulties we face when attempting to
describe what we mean by the word “self” is that there is not a
single self to be described (e.g., Stern, 1985; Neisser, 1988; Klein,
2001, 2004, 2012, 2014a; Legrand and Ruby, 2009). Rather, two
distinct (but normally interacting) aspects of the self are con-
joined in almost every discussion of the topic, although these
aspects seldom are separated. As reviewed at length in Klein
(2012, 2014a), the self meaningfully can be partitioned into the
neurally instantiated systems of self-knowledge and the self of
first-person subjectivity (e.g., James, 1890; Zahavi, 2005; Legrand
and Ruby, 2009; Strawson, 2009; Klein, 2012, 2014a).
It is beyond the scope of this paper to go into detail about the
material and subjective aspects of self [extensive discussion can
be found in Klein (2012, 2014a)]4. Briefly, they cannot be deduced
from, or reduced to, a single, underlying principle, structure, pro-
cess, substance or system (e.g., Kant, 1998; Zahavi, 2005; Klein,
2012, 2014a). One—the neuro-cognitive systems of the psycho-
physical self (consisting of such things as personal memory, body
image, emotions)—is materially (primarily, but not exclusively,
neural) instantiated and therefore capable of being apprehended
and treated as an object of scientific inquiry.
The other—the self of first-person subjectivity—is the subject
having the experience, rather than the object of that experience.
This aspect of self cannot be directly known by acts of per-
ception or introspection (e.g., Earle, 1972; Kant, 1998; Zahavi,
2003, 2005; Lund, 2005; Klein, 2012; Swinburne, 2013). Rather,
our appreciation of the self of first-person subjectivity is a mat-
ter of acquaintance or feeling, something that cannot (easily) be
conveyed via descriptive analysis (e.g., Nagel, 1974; Kant, 1998;
Zahavi, 2005; Klein, 2012, 2014a).
Despite differences in their epistemological (and possibly
ontological; e.g., Klein, 2014a) status, under normal circum-
stances these two aspects of self-interact, and this interaction
is a prerequisite for our experience of self. Indeed, it is only
via their interaction that a particular form of consciousness—
self-awareness—becomes possible [these assertions are treated
extensively in Klein (2012, 2014a); see also Gallagher and Zahavi
(2008)]. In this regard, I follow Fitche’s dictum (e.g., Neuhouser,
1990) that there can be no subject without an object or object
without a subject.
Considerable progress has been made describing the cognitive
and neurological bases of the material aspects of self (recent treat-
ments can be found in Conway, 2005; Klein and Gangi, 2010;
4In Klein (2012, 2014a) I use the terms “epistemological self” and “ontological
self” to describe the “material self” and the “self of first-person subjectivity,”
respectively. My reasons for this unconventional usage are complex (Klein,
2014a) and need not concern us here. For the clarity that comes with concep-
tual familiarity, the latter terminology (i.e., the material and subjective aspects
of self) are adopted in the present text.
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Klein and Lax, 2010; Renoult et al., 2012; Martinelli et al., 2013;
Prebble et al., 2013). This is because the material, neuro-cognitive
bases of self-knowledge can be (and have been) objectified, and
thus amenable to scientific analysis.
The subjective aspect of self, by contrast, is too poorly under-
stood to bear the definitional weight required when placed in
relation to predicates (e.g., regulation, image, complexity, hand-
icapping, verification, etc.) or contexts (e.g., synaptic, cultural,
narrative, etc.). Moreover, as discussed below, treating the subjec-
tive self as an object has the unfortunate consequence of stripping
it of its core feature—its subjectivity (for discussions see Zahavi,
2005; Ganeri, 2012; Klein, 2012, 2014a).
Researchers often fail to appreciate that the self of first-person
subjectivity is not the object of their experimental inquiries (e.g.,
Klein, 2012; Klein and Nelson, 2014). Nor could it be. Objectivity
is based on the assumption that an event or object exists indepen-
dent of any individual’s awareness of it (e.g., Earle, 1955; Nagel,
1974; Rescher, 1997; Martin, 2008); it is something other than
self. When objectivity is the stance adopted by the self to study
itself, the self must, of logical necessity, be directed toward what
is not self—i.e., to some “other” that serves as the self ’s object
(e.g., Husserl, 1964; Earle, 1972; Lund, 2005; Zahavi, 2005; Klein,
2014a). Thus, to study myself as an object, I must transform
myself into an “other,” that is, into a “not-self,”
Accordingly, the subjective self is not, and cannot, be an object
for itself and still maintain its subjectivity. Considered by first-
person subjectivity, the subjective aspect of self becomes an object
in the manner all objects (both mental and physical) must, of
necessity, become when apprehended (e.g., Husserl, 1964; Zahavi,
2003; Klein, 2012). In the process, the subjective aspect of the
self of first-person experience is lost from view. Paradoxically, the
subjective aspect of self can achieve objectivity only at the cost
of forfeiting its essence as a subjective center (e.g., Kant, 1998;
Zahavi, 2005; Klein, 2012, 2014a).
TYPES OF SELF AND TYPES OF PERSONAL DIACHRONICITY:
EVIDENCE AND FEELING
Personal diachronicity concerns our belief that we have an iden-
tity that originated in our past and will follow us into our future.
Although most treatments take this to be a question of how we
know (I am using “knowledge” in its non-technical, colloquial
sense, rather than its philosophical sense as true, justified, belief)
that we are the same over time, a second, equally important aspect
of diachronicity often is overlooked—i.e., on what do we base our
feeling that we are continuous in both temporal directions from
the present?
Different criteria come into play depending on whether the
self-posses “itself to itself” as an object or as a subject. When
treated as the object of subjectivity, criteria that enable us to know
that we are the same despite componential change are relevant. I
refer to these knowledge-based criteria as evidential sameness.
When the self as subject takes its own subjectivity as the basis
for sameness, by contrast, the criteria for sameness are felt. In
contradistinction to evidential criteria—i.e., a consideration of
facts relevant to a diachronicity judgment and the inferences such
considerations permit—one’s feeling of sameness derives from
one’s pre-reflective feeling that despite change in the object of
awareness, the subjective “I” by which the object is apprehended
remains unchanged (the potentially ageless nature of the subjec-
tive self is addressed in the section titled The Timelessness of the
Subjective Self). The feeling of the sameness of the subjective self
is a-theoretic—it is feeling devoid of reason and directly appre-
hended (for discussion, see Earle, 1955; Kant, 1998; Zahavi, 2005;
Gallagher and Zahavi, 2008; Klein, 2012, 2014a).
Thus, when questions of sameness are addressed to the self, the
answers we seek depend in important ways on the aspect of self
being judged. To anticipate my conclusions, logically viable and
empirically justifiable arguments for the continuity of the mate-
rial aspects of self—both its physical properties and psychological
features clearly tied by experimental evidence to neural activity
(e.g., memory, perception, and so on) are hard to come by: there
simply are no unambiguous evidential criteria (at least, given the
resources currently on hand) capable of underwriting a belief in
the diachronicity of the material aspects of self.
In contrast, one’s sense of personal diachronicity is sustainable
when the aspect of self under consideration is its subjectivity. But
this comes at a cost—our criteria for sameness, being felt rather
than known, are not amenable (in any obvious way) to quantita-
tive, evidential analysis (for discussion, see the section titled The
Problem of the Self). And this may seem too high a price to those
entrenched in a materialist world view (for discussion, see Papa-
Grimaldi, 1998; Meixner, 2005; Koons and Bealer, 2010; Nagel,
2012; Klein, 2014a).
PHILOSOPHICAL TREATMENTS OF PERSONAL
DIACHRONICITY: EVIDENTIAL SAMENESS AND THE
MATERIAL SELF
Let’s begin by examining the evidential criteria commonly used
to address the sameness of the material self. Questions of the
sameness of the material aspects of self can ordered roughly with
regard to their scope or inclusiveness. At the most general level,
questions of the sameness can be posed to the self qua physical
body:What is the relation between bodily continuity and personal
diachronicity?
While Bodily Criteria have been subject to extensive philo-
sophical analysis and debate (e.g., Williams, 1973; Parfit, 1984;
Olson, 1997, 2007; Baker, 2000), on examination it becomes
apparent that not all parts of the body carry equal evidential
weight. One organ—the brain—seems particularly germane to
evidence-based treatments of personal diachronicity.
However, even at this more nuanced level, cracks in the crite-
rial base begin to appear. Ultimately, we find that the criteria for
continuity of the material aspects of self, if they are to have any
possibility of evidential warrant, must focus on its psychologi-
cal, rather than its physical properties (e.g., Parfit, 1984). I refer
to these as Informational Criteria. One psychological property
in particular—the continuity of personal memory—traditionally
has been taken by psychologists and philosophers alike as the
most likely informational candidate for grounding judgments of
personal diachronicity in an evidential nexus (for reviews see
Perry, 2008; Sani, 2008). In this paper, I restrict analysis largely
to this aspect of the material self; I only briefly mention a few
of the less well-studied informational candidates - e.g., empathic
access).
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THE BODILY CRITERION
The most general level at which evidence for personal diachronic-
ity might be found comes from analysis of the conditions required
to bestow spatio-temporal continuity on the body. As is the case
for all physical objects, rapidity of change plays a critical role for
judgments of diachronicity (e.g., Spencer Brown, 1957; Campbell,
2004). This is made salient by consideration of Plutach’s famous
paradox of the “Ship of Theseus” (for discussions see Wiggins,
1980; Brennan, 1988; Noonan, 1989; Oderberg, 1993). In one
of its several adaptations (the one most relevant to personal
diachronicity), the question posed is whether a ship which has
had some or all its planks replaced remains the same ship?
Variations in the replacement schedule play a critical role in
the answers one is likely to intuit (e.g., Campbell, 2004). Gradual
replacement of the ship’s planks (e.g., one at a time, at a leisurely
pace), generally support the inference that the ship remains the
same. If change is too rapid, however, one’s certainty of the ship’s
continuity is challenged. Yet it is important to bear in mind that
all that varies between scenarios is the rapidity of change, not
change itself. Differences in sameness judgments appear to trade,
to some degree, on temporal considerations.
Judgments of the sameness of objects also pivot on amount of
change. Most of us are willing to grant sameness to a ship that has
one, or a few, planks replaced. But judgment is less secure when
the ship undergoes substantial (or complete) physical alteration,
even when the change is gradual. Some have proposed quanti-
tative boundaries beyond which confidence in sameness drops
precipitously (for example, Parfit, 1984, suggests componential
replacement exceeding 50% has serious negative consequences
for sameness judgments). But these numerical constraints are
based more on reasonable intuition than on logical analysis or
experimental demonstration.
When the sameness of the material self is called into ques-
tion, a similar set of issues arise. We constantly are adding to and
subtracting from our body—e.g., as we age we grow taller, gain
and lose pounds, change cells, molecules and atoms. The degree
of bodily change can be extraordinary: By some accounts all the
atoms in our body are replaced over a 10 year span. The men-
tal properties of the material self-change as well—e.g., we gain
and lose knowledge, add and lose memories, acquire new skills,
modify goals, and so on.
If change (whether physical or mental) happens slowly, most
of us assume we are the same person today we were 1min,
1 h, or one decade earlier (e.g., James, 1890; Hirsch, 1982;
Brennan, 1988; Campbell, 2004)5. But is this belief justified (e.g.,
Wiggins, 1971, 1980; Oderberg, 1993)? If, as per impossible,
the “me” of age 60 were to meet the “me” of age 10, most of
the evidential bases for spatio-temporal continuity clearly would
be lost. The old “me” would bear neither a physical resem-
blance to the young me, nor would we share many experiences,
beliefs, goals, memories and other mental features. In short,
5Rapid and substantial change, by contrast, can lead to serious doubts about
personal continuity. The classic case of Phineas Gage, who suffered profound
changes in personality closely following brain injury, led to the well-known
observation by his attending physician that Gage was “no longer Gage.” (e.g.,
O’Driscoll and Leach, 1998).
these temporally separated, gradually altered selves would have
little in common—save a largely intact genetic code. Should
we meet, we likely would meet as strangers (although the
older “me” might “know better”). In what would our sameness
consist?
THE BRAIN CRITERION
As many philosophers have observed, not all aspects of the body
are equally positioned to underwrite personal diachronicity (e.g.,
Shoemaker, 1963; Williams, 1970; Wiggins, 1971; Noonan, 1983;
Baker, 2000; Olson, 2007). One part of the body in particular—
the brain—seems disproportionately relevant to questions of the
sameness of the material self. Perhaps by focusing on a more
restricted range of bodily parts, some of the problems associated
with the Bodily Criterion can be avoided.
The role of the brain in determination of personal diachronic-
ity is placed in sharp relief by a thought experiment, popular-
ized by Shoemaker (1963) and subsequently elaborated on by
Parfit (1984). In the original scenario, Mr. Brown has his brain
transplanted into Mr. Robinson’s body. Let’s call the resulting
individual—consisting in Robinson’s body and Brown’s brain—
Mr. Brownson. Assuming the operation was successful, “what is
the identity of Mr. Brownson?”
When philosophers (and non-philosophers alike) are asked to
reflect on this scenario, the common intuition is that Brownson
is the same as the original Mr. Brown (e.g., Noonan, 1989). This
suggests that a broad Bodily Criterion must give way more cir-
cumscribed view in which certain body parts count more than
do others in determinations of personal sameness. What appears
required for continuity of the self is not the body, taken en toto,
but rather one of its parts—the brain.
THE INFORMATIONAL CRITERION
However, even the Brian Criterion may be too gross a character-
ization of what matters for personal diachronicity (e.g., Proust,
2003). The brain, after all, simply is the part of the body that hap-
pens to host memory, personality, mood, thought and a number
of other psychological faculties and functions. Perhaps body-
based criteria for the re-identification of the material self, even
those restricted to the brain, are not the best place to search for
evidentially-based criteria for self-continuity.
The argument can (and has been) made that what serves as the
criterion of sameness is not the persistence of the physical brain,
but rather the continuity of the personally-relevant information
contained within that body part. Although this information con-
tingently is located in the brain, the continuity of the information,
not of the organ in which it is housed, is what really matters
(e.g., Williams, 1973; Parfit, 1984; Brennan, 1988; Noonan, 1989;
Gallios, 1998).
Consider, as an example, the case of information transfer
popularized by Parfit (1984). Imagine there is a machine capa-
ble of extracting all the information in Person X’s brain and
transferring it to the brain of Person Y, and vice versa. Under
this “science-fiction” scenario, who would be Person X and who
would be Person Y? As Williams (1970) and many others (e.g.,
Wiggins, 1971; Noonan, 1989; Baillie, 1993; Garrett, 1998) see it,
the answer is clear—where knowledge goes identity follows.
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The most famous version of the Information Criterion is con-
tained in a passage from Locke: “Personal identity—that is, the
sameness of a rational being—consists in consciousness alone,
and as far as this consciousness can be extended backwards to any
past action or thought, so far reaches the identity of that person.”
(Locke, 1689 Bk. II, Ch. 27, Sec. 9). Although, as we will see in
the section titled The Need to Take Seriously The Self of First-
Person Subjectivity in Accounts of Personal Diachronicity, there
is some question about exactly what Locke had in mind here (e.g.,
Strawson, 2011b), the passage usually is taken to involve a person
remembering self-referential action or thought (e.g., Shoemaker
and Swinburne, 1984; Noonan, 1989), that is what cognitive
psychologists call episodic memory (e.g., Tulving, 1983).
Building on this reading, a prominent interpretation of Locke’s
view goes as follows: A person at one time, P2 at T2, is the same
person at an earlier time, P1 at T1, if and only if P2 can remem-
ber having done and experienced various things performed by
P1 (e.g., Shoemaker, 1963; Greenwood, 1967; Noonan, 1989;
Schechtman, 1990; Proust, 2003). Thus, it is the transitivity of
episodic memory that establishes the continuity of self.
Similar views are common in psychology (for reviews see
Fivush and Haden, 2003; Sani, 2008). An especially clear exposi-
tion is offered by two prominent neuroscientists: “We are not who
we are simply because we think.We are whowe are because we can
remember what we have thought about. . . . Memory is the glue
that binds our mental life, the scaffolding that holds our personal
history and that makes it possible to grow and change throughout
life. When memory is lost, as in Alzheimer’s disease, we lose the
ability to recreate our past, and as a result, we lose our connection
with ourselves and with others.” (Squire and Kandel, 1999, p. ix).
On this analysis, what makes a person the same across time are
relations of memory: it is by memory of past action that the self
attains a sense of continuity.
Because Locke’s memory-based account (and by memory he
typically is taken to mean episodic memory) has received the bulk
of attention from philosophers and psychologists, I focus on this
aspect of the informational criterion in what follows. However,
the reader should be made aware that this is not the only can-
didate for an informational criterion capable of supporting our
belief in personal diachronicity (I briefly mention a few others,
though my treatment rests firmly on the evidential offerings of
memory).
Unfortunately, as his critics were quick to note, Locke’s account
seems to entail a vicious form of circularity (Butler, 1736/1819;
Reid, 1813/1969). For a mental state to count as my memory of
a past action, it has to be the case that I was the one who per-
formed the past action. If it wasn’t me who performed the action,
then my apparent recollection is simply a mistake, not a mem-
ory. Butler states the problem bluntly: “one should really think it
self-evident, consciousness of personal identity presupposes, and
therefore cannot constitute, personal identity” (p. 290). If mem-
ory presupposes sameness of self, then trying to give an account
of identity in terms of memory seems hopeless.
Although the circularity objection is a serious problem for any
simple version of Lockean theory (e.g., Williams, 1973; Brennan,
1985; Noonan, 1989; Proust, 2003), many still favor a memory-
based account of personal diachronicity (as opposed to, say,
a bodily account; see Olson, 2007). Accordingly, a number of
emendations have been proposed to rein in the tautology (e.g.,
Schechtman, 1990; Hamilton, 1995; Collins, 1997; Slors, 2001;
Klein and Nichols, 2012; for review, see Bernecker, 2010).
I have discussed the circularity objection at length elsewhere,
and presented evidence that episodic recollection and the self are
contingently, not logically, intertwined (Klein and Nichols, 2012).
Treatment of these issues would take us far beyond the scope of
the present paper. Instead, I focus on the other well-known criti-
cism of Locke’s memory criterion—i.e., that it cannot work due to
“gaps” that necessarily occur in ourmemorial record. This issue of
episodic transitivity has exercised theorists from the earliest days
of the debate.
Hume (1739–1740/1978), conceptualizing the problem in
terms of numerical sameness, asks how could there be a quan-
titatively strict sameness across time in light of the fact that a
person’s psychology constantly is changing? Reid (1813/1969) also
takes issue with Locke’s memory criteria, arguing that even less
numerically exacting accounts present seemingly insurmountable
difficulties (although he famously rejects the memory theory of
personal identity, Reid does acknowledge that memory seems to
provide “irresistible” evidence that I am the very person who did
the action; 1813/1969).
Suppose, Reid observes, a military officer had been flogged for
robbing an orchard when he was a boy at school, had bravely van-
quished an enemy during battle, and had been made a general
later in life. Further, suppose that when he won his military cam-
paign, he could remember having been flogged at school and that
when made a general he was remembered his military victory but
no longer remembered his flogging.
As Reid sees it, if a person at time tn remembers an event that
occurred at time t1, then the person at time tn is identical with the
personwhowas witness to or the agent responsible for the event at
time t1. Thus, if the brave officer who defeated the enemy remem-
bers being beaten at school, then the officer is identical with the
boy who was beaten. By similar logic, if the general remembers
defeating the enemy in battle, then the general is identical with
the brave officer. If the general is identical with the brave offi-
cer, and the officer is identical with the boy, then, by the logic of
transitivity, the general is identical with the boy.
However, since the sameness of memory is a necessary condi-
tion for sameness of self, if a person at time tn does not remember
an event that occurred at time t1, then the person at time tn cannot
be the same as any person who was witness to or agent of the event
at time t1. Thus, if the general cannot remember being beaten at
school, he cannot be the same as the boy who was beaten. Locke’s
memory account thus suffers from a set of mutually incompatible
theses—i.e., the general is both the same as and different from the
boy.
Williams (1973) has identified another obstacle facing an evi-
dential account of personal sameness based on memory criteria.
He invites us to imagine a situation in which the memory claims
of Person X are continuous with those of deceased Person Y. That
is, Person X’s memory claims map unanimously with the life-
history of Person Y. Does this mean that Person X is Person Y?
And if so, does this mean that a person can be alive and dead at the
same time? It is clear that memory-based evidence (and episodic
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recollection in particular) suffers from problems that render the
utility of the Informational Criterion less than optimal.
Some have attempted to circumvent these problems by propos-
ing that information other than memory might provide the evi-
dential basis for judgments of personal diachroncity. Schechtman
(2001), for example, suggests we shift emphasis from an exclu-
sive reliance on memorial criteria to what she calls “empathic
access”—i.e., one’s psychological make-up, broadly construed
to include desires, feelings, goals, values, beliefs, memory, etc.
(Schechtman is not alone in this regard, though others do not
adopt her terminology of “empathic access”). Others have argued
that relaxing the requirement of immediate access to a tempo-
rally continuous succession of remembered events might avoid
the problem of “gapy” memorial records (e.g., Brennan, 1985).
On this account, it is sufficient that we show enough coherence
in our recollections to merit the assignment of sameness to a
person.
But, with regard to the former approach, potential gaps and
issues of transitivity still remain in play even when mental states
other than those strictly taken as memory are recruited as eviden-
tial criteria (for discussion, see Klein, 2014b). And the relaxation
argument is shown to be inadequate in light of circumstances in
which individuals maintain a sense of personal continuity despite
the complete loss of episodic memory (as we will see in the next
section). In addition, it is unclear just what constitutes “enough”
coherence.
PSYCHOLOGICAL TREATMENTS OF PERSONAL
DIACHRONICITY: EVIDENTIAL SAMENESS AND THE
MATERIAL SELF
Most philosophical treatments of personal diachronicity, as we
have seen, rely on “thought experiments” to identify the eviden-
tial bases of sameness judgments. Arguments resulting from this
“mental empiricism” are believed viable if they can be shown to
be internally consistent and logically coherent.
Recently, however, philosophers have begun to question the
utility of thought experiments unconstrained by scientific empiri-
cism (e.g., Wilkes, 1988; Focquaert, 2003). Coherence and con-
sistency may allow us to judge the logical warrant of a criterion,
but conceivability should not be confused with empirical possi-
bility. Perhaps if logical considerations were supplemented with
empirical evidence, there still might be hope for a memory-based
approach to personal sameness.
Psychologists apparently think so: Many accept (often uncrit-
ically) the idea that memory—in particular, its episodic compo-
nent —is the basis of personal diachronicity (e.g., Rubin, 1986;
Conway, 2005; Markowitsch and Staniliou, 2011; Bluck and Liao,
2013; for reviews see Fivush and Haden, 2003 and Sani, 2008).
Neurological case studies appear especially suited to shedding
light on this issue (e.g., Rathbone et al., 2009; Illman et al., 2011;
Duval et al., 2012; Picard et al., 2013; Klein, 2014b). Specifically,
cases of neurological impairment offer the possibility of observing
dissociations between a belief in one’s temporal continuity and
the neurological mechanisms posited to support that belief. In
this way, one can examine the extent to which belief in the same-
ness of self contingently depends on the availability of neurally
instantiated informational criteria.
When examined critically, however, the evidence is not encour-
aging. As I show below, episodic memory cannot, by itself, do
the work needed to underpin one’s belief in one’s sameness over
time. While recollection may be useful in response to personally
or socially motivated requests for evidential support, case studies
have shown that episodic memory can be lost (even completely)
without any obvious consequences for one’s sense of diachronic-
ity (for reviews see Klein and Gangi, 2010; Craver, 2012; Klein,
2012, 2014b). In short, empirical evidence (as well as logical con-
siderations; e.g., the issues of non-transitivity identified by Reid)
make clear that while episodic memory may be sufficient for one’s
sense of personal continuity, it is not necessary6.
SEMANTIC MEMORY AND PERSONAL DIACHRONICITY
Before abandoning a memorial criterion, however, it is impor-
tant to keep in mind that the self is represented in systems other
than episodic memory (for reviews, see Klein, 2004; Gillihan and
Farah, 2005; Klein and Gangi, 2010; Klein and Lax, 2010; Renoult
et al., 2012; Martinelli et al., 2013). Within semantic memory, for
example, there are (at least) two different subsystems devoted to
autobiographical knowledge (for review and discussion, see Klein
and Lax, 2010). One contains factual self -knowledge (e.g., “I am
61” and “I live in Goleta”). The other is the repository of knowl-
edge of one’s personality traits (e.g., “I am intelligent” and “I am
not punctual”).
There now exists an extensive data-base showing that patients
suffering episodic amnesia still can retain access personal facts
and trait characteristics (for evidence and reviews see Tulving
et al., 1988; Tulving, 1993; Klein et al., 1996; Rathbone et al.,
2009; Klein and Gangi, 2010; Klein and Lax, 2010; Martinelli
et al., 2013). It is possible, some have suggested, that one’s sense
of personal identity can be maintained by semantic forms of self-
knowledge (factual and trait) in the presence of episodic amnesia.
Consistent with this position, evidence suggests that one’s sense
of personal sameness is not lost despite (sometimes pervasive)
episodicmemory impairment (e.g., Rathbone et al., 2009; Haslam
et al., 2010; Illman et al., 2011; Duval et al., 2012; Klein, 2014b).
A DISSOCIATION BETWEEN FACTUAL SELF-KNOWLEDGE AND TRAIT
SELF-KNOWLEDGE
These cases and others like them [reviewed in Klein and Lax
(2010)] demonstrate a dissociation between episodic and seman-
tic forms of self-knowledge7. But can semantic knowledge of one’s
traits dissociate from other types of semantic knowledge (both
self- and non-self-referential)? Further testing suggests that it can.
6To argue that episodic memory is neither necessary nor sufficient, one would
need to produce a case in which a person has episodic memory but no
semantic memory, and that under these circumstances a sense of personal
diachronicity was absent. Such a case, however, is not found in the annals of
neuroscience (and I am not sure that a situation in which a person has intact
episodic memory accompanied by complete absence of semantic memory
is—on definitional, linguistic or phylogenetic grounds—possible).
7The relation between semantic trait self-knowledge and episodic recollec-
tions of trait-relevant behavior is a complicated affair. Suffice it to say that
a substantial body of research shows that the respective roles of these two
systems of memory in the creation of trait self-knowledge depend on a large
number of factors (for a recent review see Klein et al., 2008).
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Consider the case of Patient D.B., a 79-year old man who
became profoundly amnesic as a result of anoxia following car-
diac arrest. One particularly noxious consequence of his anoxia
was that it rendered him incapable of episodically recollecting a
single thing he ever had done or experienced.
To test his semantic trait self-knowledge, we asked D.B. on
two separate occasions to judge a list of personality traits for
self-descriptiveness. We also asked his 49-year-old daughter (with
whom he lives) to rate him on the same traits. Our findings
revealed that D.B.’s trait ratings were both reliable and consis-
tent with the way he is perceived by others (for analyses and
discussion see Klein et al., 2002c). Moreover, his access to trait
self-knowledge was indistinguishable from age-matched, neuro-
logical healthy controls. He thus maintained accurate and reliable
knowledge of his personality despite lacking access to specific
actions and experiences on which that trait knowledge was based.
A similar picture is presented by patient K.C. Tulving (1993).
Despite suffering a complete loss of episodic memory, K.C.’s
ability to access trait self-knowledge remained intact.
Although D.B. knew which traits described him, he had
considerable difficulty accessing semantic-based factual self-
knowledge. For example, he no longer could recall the names of
any friends from his childhood or even the year of his birth. He
also showed spotty knowledge of facts in the public domain. For
instance, although he was able to accurately recount a number
of details about certain historical events, his knowledge of other
historical facts was seriously compromised (e.g., he claimed that
America was discovered by the British in 1812).
Taken together, these findings evidence dissociations within
semantic memory. On the one hand, D.B.’s general semantic
knowledge and factual self-knowledge was impaired; on the other
hand, his semantic trait self-knowledge was spared and, at least
with respect to the measures used, indistinguishable from that of
control participants.
Moreover, his ability to retrieve trait self-knowledge was not
due simply to the sparing of the systems responsible for maintain-
ing a data-base of trait knowledge (whether about self or other).
For example, D.B. was unable to produce accurate knowledge of
his daughter’s traits (e.g., Klein et al., 2002c). Similar selectivity
favoring trait self-knowledge also has been found to characterize
autistic memory function (e.g., Klein et al., 1999, 2004).
These findings suggest that the resilience of trait self-
knowledge is not a general property of semantic trait-knowledge.
Rather, it appears specific to trait generalizations about the self.
Indeed, my colleagues and I have yet to find a population (e.g.,
amnesia, autism, ADHD, Alzheimer’s Dementia, Prosopagnosia,
Schizophrenia) that cannot reliably and accurately report knowl-
edge of their own traits despite (often considerable) disruption of
other neurological and cognitive function (for reviews see Klein
and Lax, 2010; Klein et al., 2013).
In contrast to the conclusions just voiced, work reported in
a volume edited by Prigatano and Schacter (1991) suggests that
people suffering deficits following neural injury sometimes do
not recognize the extent to which particular trait-based char-
acterizations apply to them. In addition, evidence is presented
that patient and family members may give different answers to
questions about traits that describe the patient.
However, as discussed at some length in Klein et al. (2013),
the question of the stability of one’s beliefs about his or her
personality traits does not trade on agreement between one’s
views and those of others. People—whether brain damaged or
fully intact—often disagree with others about which traits best
describe them (e.g., Klein et al., 2002a). The question is whether
a person’s beliefs about his or her dispositions remains stable
(even if at odds with the beliefs of others) over time, not the
assumed accuracy of those beliefs. And with respect to the former
concern, the evidence is that our beliefs about our dispositions
remain remarkably stable even in the presence of considerable
neurological damage and cognitive chaos.
Returning to the question of personal diachronicity, a review
of the evidence suggests that that individuals suffering loss of
both episodic and factual semantic knowledge still have a sense of
temporal self-extension (Klein, 2012, 2014b). Perhaps, then, the
remarkable stability of semantic trait self-knowledge provides the
bedrock fromwhich one’s sense of personal diachronicity springs.
In summary, with respect to the Evidential Criterion, long-
term memory does not seem necessary for one’s feeling of per-
sonal identity across time (for a similar conclusion, see Craver,
2012). The fact that patients like D.B. lack access to episodic
memory and show impairments of factual semantic personal
memory yet maintain a sense of personal diachronicity (possi-
bly influenced to some degree and in some, as yet, unspecified
manner by the stability of semantic trait self-knowledge) suggests
one does not need either episodic memory or factual seman-
tic self-knowledge to experience the sameness of self [a similar
conclusion, based on philosophical considerations, is found in
Strawson (2005)].
PERSONAL DIACHRONICITY AND THE SUBJECTIVE SELF
“If we would have true knowledge of anything, we must quit the
body.”
(Phaedo, quoted in Russell, 1949, p. 159).
Thus, far I have examined some of the evidential criteria by
which we might make judgments of personal sameness over time.
These criteria apply in their most straight-forward manner to
those aspects of the self that fall under the heading “material”—
i.e., the psycho-physical features of self-amenable to objectifica-
tion. Unfortunately, as we have seen, with the possible exception
of trait self-knowledge, the utility of this evidence for underwrit-
ing our sense of personal continuity is at best questionable.
There is, however, another aspect of self—its first-person
subjectivity—that has received little attention as a possible basis
of personal diachronicity. Is there any reason to suspect this aspect
of self may serve as the foundation of our feeling of diachronic-
ity? I believe there is, and my reasons for so believing, as well as
the empiricism on which they are based, are the focus of the next
several sections of this paper.
THE NEED TO TAKE SERIOUSLY THE SELF OF FIRST-PERSON
SUBJECTIVITY IN ACCOUNTS OF PERSONAL DIACHRONICITY
First-person subjectivity is a universal aspect of our experience
of self; one that, despite well-known difficulties situating it in a
materialist framework (e.g., Klein, 2014a), is a phenomenological
reality that cannot be ignored if one is to fully appreciate what
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it means to be a self (e.g., James, 1890; Kant, 1998; Lund, 2005;
Zahavi, 2005; Dainton, 2008; Legrand and Ruby, 2009; Strawson,
2009; Klein, 2012, 2014a). Equations and measurements can be
useful when they are related to experience; but experience comes
first (e.g., Gallagher and Zahavi, 2008; Klein, 2014a).
It is undeniable that many, if not all, of the great achievements
in modern science were made possible by the exclusion of “sub-
jectivity” from the world around us. However, a comprehensive
appreciation of reality must include that aspect of reality that
makes its understanding possible—i.e., the subjectivity of self that
provides us with the ability to be aware of the world of which it is
a part. To do otherwise is to exclude by stipulation that aspect
of nature that makes nature knowable to itself. As Ricard and
Thuan (2001) observe, “If we define the terrain field of science
as what can be physically studied, measured, and calculated, then
right from the start we leave out everything that is experienced in
the first person, and all immaterial phenomena. If we forget this
limitation, then we soon start affirming that the universe is every-
thing that can be objectified in the third person, and only what is
material.” (p. 241).
It thus seems prudent to consider the possibility that our
sense of self-sameness derives from feelings obtained from and
apprehended by the conscious aspect of self. In this regard, it
is interesting to note that Strawson (2011b) has made a strong
case for taking Locke at his word—to wit, when Locke posits the
continuity of consciousness as the foundation of diachronic per-
sonal identity, he means just that: Continuity derives from the
felt invariance of subjectivity (i.e., the subjective aspect of self),
not from evidential (e.g., memorial) sources which subjectivity
takes as its objects (which are in a continual state of change). On
awakening each morning, I immediately am aware of my self, that
“I” exist. My feeling of self as a psychological continuant is not
something I need to deduce or reconstruct to justify my feeling of
continuity 8. As Heidegger observes, “I am always somehow
acquainted with myself” (1993, p. 251). Locke is more blunt:
“consciousness alonemakes self” (Locke, 1689 Bk. II, Ch. 27, Sec.
9; emphasis added).
While non-memory impaired individuals can recollect mate-
rial with self-referential content—and often do so for legal, per-
sonal, or, more typically, social reasons—such recollections do
not appear to be required for one’s feeling of personal continu-
ity. During most waking moments, I simply am I, an enduring,
conscious presence given directly and pre-reflectively to aware-
ness absent any analytic reckoning (e.g., Neuhouser, 1990; Kant,
1998; Klein, 2014a).
THE CONTINUITY OF THE SUBJECTIVE SELF: EVIDENCE-BASED
DIACHRONICITY
In the section titled Sameness and the Self: The Problem of
Personal Diachronicity I made the observation that the self of
first-person subjectivity entails a feeling, and that this feeling
does not vary over time. In that sense, it always is present as an
8For example, it should require time to reconstruct a coherent, “sufficiently”
unbroken self-narrative; thus, evidential sources of diachronicity could not
easily provide the immediate sense that I am the continuing existent I take it
most people refer to when they claim to experience sameness of self over time.
“experiential given” underpinning our feeling of sameness (cf.,
James, 1890).
However, this is not to imply that this feeling serves as a
comparative basis (i.e., with past feelings of sameness) thereby
supporting a conclusion of temporal continuity. To do so would
be to conflate the modes of operation of two ontologically distinct
aspects of the self—the neuro-psychological (e.g., memory-based
comparisons) with the subjective, non-evaluative aspect of self
(my reasons for positing ontological separability—but causal
relatedness—between these two aspects of the self are given in
Klein (2014a). I cannot repeat them here, as to do so would greatly
exceed the limits on word count for manuscripts of this type.
Accordingly, the interested—or confused—reader is referred to
arguments presented in detail in the above reference. I apologize
in advance for any lack of clarity within the present text).
Moreover, to construe the felt invariance of the subjective self
as a basis for comparative judgments of personal diachronicity
would conflate evidential with felt sameness. These two modes
of experiencing sameness, I am arguing, need to be kept both
conceptually and functionally distinct.
However, for some this will seem to beg the question of why or
how felt invariance translates into a directly given, conceptually
unanalyzed sense of being a temporal continuant—a feeling that,
under most circumstances, we take as default—i.e., it is an un-
reflected core aspect of our experiential being—and thus does not
require (and is not subjected) to critical analysis.
Two considerations merit mention. First, there is no reason
why felt sameness cannot be taken as an object of subjectivity and
consequently evaluated. Indeed, I suspect it often is when moti-
vation (either internally or externally mandated) argues in favor
of considerations of evidential support for personal diachronic-
ity. Second, however, I also am arguing that evidential criteria
typically are not part of our experience of continuity. Rather,
what underwrites are feeling of being a personal continuant is just
that—the pre-reflectively given, conceptually unexamined feeling
that I am I (e.g., Zahavi, 1999; Strawson, 2005). In this sense, per-
sonal diachronicity is not even (typically) a belief (though it can
become so under circumstances calling for evidential warrant);
rather it is a background presumption that is as much a part
of our phenomenology as is the feeling that “I am alive” (e.g.,
we simply take it as an un-reflected given absent any analysis—
though reasons can be provided when necessary).
With these considerations in mind, let’s turn again, the case
of patient D.B., whose uninterrupted access to personal mem-
ory was severely restricted. Might his intact subjectivity provide
a basis for his sense of diachronicity? The answer depends on the
criteria we use to investigate one’s sense of personal diachronic-
ity and the manner in which “sense of personal diachronicity” is
conceptualized.
Seen in terms of evidential criteria, episodic memory loss
renders patients such as D.B. and K.C. (e.g., Tulving, 1993;
Klein et al., 2002c) unable to access information about their
life history—i.e., their lived past as well as imagined future
(for a recent review, see Klein, 2013a). Patient K.C., who suf-
fered a total loss of episodic memory due to a motorcycle
accident, describes his personal future as content-free and infor-
mationally vacant (it is important to note that individuals with
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intact episodic memory have no problem imagining content-rich,
future-oriented personal scenarios; for a recent review see Klein,
2013a)9.
E.T.: (Endel Tulving): “Let’s try the question again about the
future. What will you be doing tomorrow?”
K.C.: smiles faintly (following a 15-s pause) and responds: “I
don’t know.”
E.T.: “Do you remember the question?”
K.C.: “About what I will be doing tomorrow?”
E.T.: “Yes. How would you describe your state of mind when
you try to think about it?”
K.C., after a 5-s pause, replies: “Blank, I guess.”
(Tulving, 1985; Tulving, p. 4: Note, in the original, patient K.C.
was referred to as N.N.)
D.B. shows similar difficulties. When asked to provide infor-
mation about personal events in his past, he is at a complete loss.
In addition, he shows a conspicuous inability to project himself
into an imagined future (Klein et al., 2002b).
These limitations in evidence-based mental time travel—and
the difficulties they present for the sense of personal diachronic-
ity construed as an evidence-based ability to subjectively navigate
personal time—are not due to patients’ difficulties comprehend-
ing the meaning of temporal concepts. Unpublished data (Klein,
2000; Craver, 2013) make plain that both K.C. and D.B. have a
firm grasp of the concepts of past, present and future.
In response to the question “What is the future?” K.C. replies
“Events that haven’t happened yet,” while the question “What is
the past?” is answered “Events that have already happened”. Asked
“Can you change the past?” K.C. emphatically states “No!” When
queried “Can you change the future, and if so, how?” he observes
“Yes. By doing different things.” To the question “Can something
that happens in the future change what has happened in the past?”
K.C. again responds with an emphatic “No,” while the query “If
an event is in the future will it always stay in the future?” elicits
the response “No. Because time moves on.”
Patient D.B. also presents a nuanced understanding of tem-
porality. In response to the question “What is the future?” he
answers “Things that haven’t happened yet, but someday will.”
He describes the past as “Things that happened before. . . but are
not happening now.” Asked “Can you change the past?” D.B. says:
“Don’t think so, unless you had a time machine or something.
Don’t think so. . . not really. Maybe in science fiction (laughs).”
To the question “Can the past influence the present?” he replies
“Sure. All the time. . . that’s the way things work.”
In short, when the sense of personal diachronicity is con-
ceptualized in terms of evidential criteria, individuals lacking
total access to episodic memory (as well as suffering impair-
ments of semantic personal knowledge) show a profound inability
to engage in personally-relevant temporal extension. They are
unable to (a) provide evidence-based knowledge of their personal
past or (b) generate content-based personal future scenarios.
9Future-oriented mental time travel is well-known to depend onmemory (for
recent reviews see Szpunar, 2010; Schacter, 2012; Klein, 2013a).
THE CONTINUITY OF THE SUBJECTIVE SELF: FELT DIACHRONICITY
When personal diachronicity is considered in terms of felt rather
than evidence-based criteria, however, a markedly different pic-
ture of personal continuity emerges. As we have seen, when he
was asked to recall his past or to describe his possible future,
D.B.’s interlocutors were met either with uncomfortable silence
or expressed bewilderment.Gaping holes in his corpus of self-
knowledge —brought to his attention by explicit requests—
caused D.B. confusion, concern and fear; i.e., the type of reactions
one would expect from a mentally coherent individual unable
to fully comprehend the evidential vacuum experienced by his
subjective self (Klein, 2012, 2014b).
This is a critical point, but one easily missed: When
requested to provide evidence in support of his sense of per-
sonal diachronicity, D.B. expresses agitated concern: “I should,
shouldn’t I?” he wonders aloud. But he can’t. In response to
my query “Do you feel as though you are the same person you
were before your heart attack?” D.B. replies: “If you mean, am
I the same person. . .well not really. I have these head issues you
know. . . can’t seem to remember like I use to. But if youmean have
I, D.B. (for confidentiality, this is not the name he actually used),
lived a long life. . .well, of course. And I hope to keep at it.” In
short, D.B. is troubled when made aware (either by personal con-
cerns or the requests of others) of the unavailability of evidence
that, under normal circumstances, would be available to inform
his sense of self as a temporal continuant.
This clearly is not a person lacking a sense of temporal per-
sistence (although he is unable martial evidence in support of
that sense). He is concerned about the fate that has befallen his
(apparently intact) feeling of himself as an enduring entity. What
he lacks is the ability to supplement this feeling with evidential
offerings from his material self. Interestingly, the absence of an
ability to recollect a personal past or imagine a personal future
does not appear either to trouble or to capture the attention of his
subjective sense of self unless the situation makes his deficits the
object of his awareness.
A similar appreciation of the continuity of self in the presence
of evidential deficit is found with patient H.M. Replying to the
question “How do you feel about yourself?” he observes “I feel I
have failed more than the average person. . . I feel like a complete
failure as a person. . . I am disappointed in myself.” (Hilts, 1995, p.
153). Like D.B., H.M. may not be able to offer evidential support
for his feeling of continuity, but he clearly feels himself to be a
temporal continuant, one whose past acts have failed to meet his
current expectations. Apparently, somethingmore than evidential
criteria is at work in underwriting one’s sense of diachronicity.
A particularly compelling example of intact sense of personal
diachronicity in the presence of severe impairment to the eviden-
tial bases for that felt sameness comes from the case of Zasetsky
(Luria, 1972). Zasetsky was a Russian soldier, who, as the result
of battle, was left aphasic, perceptually and proprioceptively dis-
oriented and hemianopic. He also became densely amnesic, with
severe impairment (both antrograde and retrograde) of episodic
as well as semantic memory function.
As a result of deficits in proprioception and kinesthetic feed-
back, Zasetsky had trouble feeling and locating parts of his own
body. His perception of the external world suffered as well.
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External objects either were nonexistent or appeared as frag-
mented, flickering background entities.
Having lost most of his personal memory, his ability to recall
his past and plan for his future was virtually non-existent (for
a recent discussion of the relation between memory and mental
time travel, see Klein, 2013a). He professed to have no clear idea
of his preferences, beliefs, values, or goals. In short, Zasetsky was
unable to access most of his sources of epistemic self-knowledge.
Despite the great challenges presented, Zasetsky struggled to
piece together the evidential fragments that remained from his
material self. Under the patient tutelage of Luria and others, he
slowly and painfully regained some rudimentary ability to read,
write and perform basic bodily functions. As a consequence, he
was able to provide Luria with a record of his thoughts and feel-
ings about the changes to the self brought about by his difficulty
providing first-person subjectivity with content from the now
largely dysfunctional aspects of his material self.
But- and this is the key point—despite monumental loss of
access to material bases of self, Zasetsky maintained a feeling of
personal sameness. He was painfully aware of his deficits and
greatly troubled by their effects on his ability to place him-
self physically, temporally and spatially. He complained often
about the confusion engendered by impairments of perceptual,
kinesthetic and proprioceptive feedback; he was disorientated by
his loss of preferences and difficulties imagining his future or
recalling his past.
Thus, at no time was his subjective self-awareness lost (save,
perhaps, periods of dreamless sleep): The “I” always was there—
troubled, bewildered, angered, and confused by its loss of access
to sources of self-knowledge, yet determined to salvage what-
ever it could of a life left in cognitive and perceptual shambles.
In the end, it was this subjectively felt determination to improve
his situation that led Zasetsky to undertake the arduous rehabil-
itative program that enabled the subjective self to regain partial
contact with the external world and aspects of the material self.
He doggedly maintained hope for a life better than the one that
had befallen him in battle. And “hope” is word whose meaning
unambiguously implies a sense of self as a personal continuant.
In short, there is strong empirical support for the proposi-
tion that a person, absent most of what we would place under
the heading of “material self” still can retain a clear feeling of
his or her sameness and temporal continuity. What is particularly
noteworthy in Zaztesky’s case are his concerted efforts to distance
himself from what he had become and recapture a semblance of
normality.
THE TIMELESSNESS OF THE SUBJECTIVE SELF
One fascinating, but often overlooked, aspect of the experience of
patients with temporally graded amnesia (e.g., the law of “first in,
last out”; Ribot, 1882) is that the subjective aspect of self typically
is not confused by, or troubled over, its inability to recollect events
and experiences covered by memory loss (unless, of course, the
self is confronted with evidence of the incongruity between the
passage of time and current self-beliefs. Absent such confronta-
tion, the patient appears relatively content to see him or herself
as being of the age at which personal memories remains available;
for review and discussion, see Klein, 2012).
Consider, for example, the case of patient, J.G. (Sacks, 1985).
As the result of Korsakoff syndrome, J.G. was unable to recol-
lect any personal happenings postdating 1948. Despite passage of
nearly 30 years since the onset of his amnesia, testing revealed that
J.G. believes he still is a young man, and that the year still is 1948
(it was 1975). Consistent with his beliefs, on being shown his face
in a mirror (i.e., that of a much older man) J.G. is stunned and
confused. Fortunately, due to his amnesia, after a few moments
of distraction and J.G. once again is relaxed and comfortably
situated in 1948.
The remarkable case of patient B. (Storring, 1936) brings the
relation between memory, personal temporality and the sub-
jective self into strong relief. As a result of a gas poisoning
accident, patient B. was rendered incapable of remembering any-
thing occurring post-injury for more than roughly one second!
At the time of testing (the mid-1930’s) he knew nothing of the life
he had lived post-poisoning or of his marriage of the past 5 years.
Like J.G., he is perplexed every time he sees himself in a mirror –
10 years earlier he looked much different. While psycho-physcial
aspects of his self have changed with time, the subjective aspect of
self-shows no comparable evidence of change: For B.’s first-person
subjectivity, it is, and always will be May 1926.
There are many aspects of this case that merit extensive discus-
sion. For my purposes, however, the relevant features pertain to
what it can tell us about B.’s self of first-person subjectivity, a self
whose knowledge of the aging process has been decoupled from
changes to the material self-brought about by the passage of time.
The subjective self, no longer having access to these changes, does
not show a parallel aging of its own. B. has become a man of the
eternal present.
However, as Storring (1936) notes at length, B. is not a man of
the moment: “B. gives meaning to the situation before his senses.
And it is this context that reaches from one second to the next
that creates the flowing transition. A sensible, reasonable task is
harmoniously carried to its completion, regardless of how long it
takes, because . . . the rational whole is known in the situation as
a goal which is then fulfilled” (Storring, 1936, pp. 75–76). This
is a person, Storring concludes, with a second-long conscious-
ness that nevertheless has a clear sense of personal continuity. The
subjective self, anchored in the past as a result of disruption of
sensory and cognitive processes, nevertheless, remains a constant,
experiencing, feeling, thinking center of subjectivity unperturbed
by the passage of time.
The take-away message is that seldom, if ever, do we find a
patient who claims to experience himself as much older than
his or her intact recollections would suggest; rather, we find the
reverse—the patient resides in the past (provided he or she has
access to some personal recollections) and is troubled only when
a discrepancy between content provided by the material self (or
one’s senses) fails to match current beliefs (Klein, 2012). The self
of first-person subjectivity thus seems outside of the aging pro-
cess, accepting whatever the material self has to offer vis a vis
evidence of temporal placement.
PERSONAL DIACHRONICITY AND THE SENSE OF SELF
At this point in the discussion, a reasonable question concerns the
extent to which personal diachronicity is a “phenomenological
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given.” That is, to what degree are considerations of self-
continuity the result of social requests, moral obligations and con-
ceptual curiosity, as opposed to a basic attitude we spontaneously
adopt toward our everyday experience of self?
If one accepts the proposition that first-person subjectivity is a
pre-reflectively given and ageless aspect of the subjective self, then
diachronicity per semay not actually be a live issue for one’s every-
day sense of self. It may only become so when a person attempts
to provide evidential support for personal continuance (e.g., from
memories supplied by the material aspect of self). On this view,
diachronicity is not so much felt as it is logically constructed from
informational content (which, as we have seen, does not easily
translate into unambiguous criteria for personal continuity).
Personal diachronicity thus may come into play largely at the
evidential level. Since, the self of first-person subjectivity is not
experienced as changing with time, considerations of personal
diachronicity typically are not a part of our sense of self. They
become a part when the self is taken as an object of reflection; and
this, in turn, occurs when we are called on—either by personal
concerns or external contingencies—to directly address issues
pertaining to the self as a temporal continuant.
An obvious objection would be that “the reason that the self
of subjectivity in not experienced as changing is because the self
of subjectivity is not experienced at all.” While such an objec-
tion has some force, I believe there are two different responses
that can partly address this concern. First, first-person subjectivity
is perhaps the single most salient aspect of everyday experience.
Of course, it is always (per Brentano) conflated with intentional
objects (although advocates of “pure consciousness” argue that
subjective states absent intentional objects can, with extensive
training, be attained; e.g., Forman, 1990). But, as many have
argued (for recent reviews, see Legrand and Ruby, 2009; Klein,
2012, 2014a), our acquaintance with the self of first-person sub-
jectivity is a necessary postulate to capture what we mean by a
sense of oneself. Second, the evidence presented in this paper of
patient’s suffering varying degrees of cognitive impairment, yet
still maintaining a coherent sense of diachronicity are consistent
with the notion that what underwrites this feeling is the constancy
of subjectivity and not the flickering or non-existent objects taken
by that subjectivity. While these arguments are consistent with
the assumption that the felt invariance of subjectivity underlies
the sense of sameness, it must be acknowledged that neither pro-
vides a conclusive refutation of the objection raised. Accordingly,
it remains a live possibility.
In summary, we typically do not feel ourselves to be different
over time. When we do, it most often is the result of our conti-
nuity being called to question by self or other. Moreover, to the
extent that memory, in particular, and evolutionary considera-
tions, in general, play a part in our sense of temporal continuity, it
is the “now and the next”, not the past, to which our pre-reflective
sentiments gravitate (for discussion of the future-orientation of
memory, see Klein, 2013b). As Strawson (personal communica-
tion) puts it, the temporality of subjective self consists in “and
now and now and now.”10
10The Earl of Shaftesbury (1698) captures in a few well-chosen sentences
much of what I have been struggling to say: “The metaphysicians. . . affirm
We should not draw from these observations the conclusion
that the subjective aspect of self necessarily is immortal or tran-
scendental. It very well may be incapable of existing apart from
the body (e.g., Olson, 2007). It may be an emergent property
of the material self (e.g., Hasker, 1999). But this emergence—if
indeed it is emergence—is something we clearly do not know how
to deal with within the context of current theory and research in
science and philosophy.
We are a long way from beginning to answer questions about
the self of first-person subjectivity. Yet, in my opinion, answers to
these questions are fundamental for a psychology that takes as its
goal the full appreciation of human experience.
SOME FINAL THOUGHTS
In this paper, I have argued that our non-analytic, pre-reflective
feeling of the self may be the primary determinant of our intu-
ition of self as temporally extended. Explicit considerations of
personal diachronicity come into play primarily when contingen-
cies make it necessary to contemplate (and provide evidence in
support of) personal continuity. In their absence, one’s sense of
self as a temporal continuant is more one of unreflected accep-
tance than explicit formulation. Sameness is the self ’s default
mode – a felt identity uninformed by evidence. And, in virtue
of the unchanging nature of subjectivity, diachronicity becomes
a concern of the self only when considerations of personal tem-
porality are selected by environmental demand, personal concern
or philosophical query to serve as the objects of subjectivity11.
Plato maintained that true knowledge could only be sensed
by the soul. Aristotle, in contrast, believed knowledge is derived
from evidence provided by the body. The tension between sense
and evidence has been a source of academic, social, political and
religious debate (often acrimonious) for more than two millen-
nia, with the emphasis shifting as a function of cultural as well as
intellectual imperatives (e.g., Koestler, 1989).
In this paper I have made my case for the non-evidential basis
of one’s sense of sameness over time. However, this should not be
seen as a call to reaffirm the Platonic distaste of understanding by
reliance on the “grossness of bodily senses.” Rather, it is an appeal
to broaden our criteria for understanding beyond the reductionist
materialism that characterizes much of Western thinking, and to
embrace the possibility that there are aspects of reality that may
not (easily) submit to such highly circumscribed treatment (e.g.,
Meixner, 2008; Papa-Grimaldi, 2010; Nagel, 2012; Klein, 2014a).
that if memory be taken away, the self is lost. [But] what matter for memory?
What have I to do with that part? If, whilst I am, I am as I should be, what do
I care more? And thus let me lose self every hour, and be 20 successive selfs, or
new selfs,’ tis all one to me: so [long as] I lose not my opinion [i.e., my overall
outlook, my character, my moral identity]. If I carry that with me’tis I; all is
well. . .—The now; the now. Mind this: in this is all.” (cited in Strawson, 2008,
p. 198, parenthetical comments added).
11Ricoeur’s (1994) distinction between sameness (memete) and selfhood
(ipseite) is particularly germane to our discussion of personal diachronicity.
Ricoeur argues that selfhood is maintained despite changes in the evidential
criteria for sameness (i.e., character dispositions and other marks that permit
the reindentification of an individual as being the same over time). This view,
based exclusively on philosophical considerations, offers strong support for
our empirical observations concerning the insufficiency of evidential criteria
for continuity of self.
Frontiers in Psychology | Perception Science January 2014 | Volume 5 | Article 29 | 12
Klein Sameness and the self
Some phenomena, if they are to be saved, can be saved only if we
allow that knowledge by acquaintance (e.g., Russell, 1912/1999)
sometimes may be the metaphysically propitious stance. Personal
diachronicity very well may be a case in point.
An appreciation of “reality” in its fullness likely requires we
strike a balance between the different approaches to knowledge
championed by Plato and Aristotle. Only by affecting a rap-
prochement between these “seemingly” conflicting metaphysical
commitments will a sufficiently inclusive understanding of reality
be a potentially realizable objective.
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